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Abstract
The origins of bisimulation and bisimilarity are examined, in the three
ﬁelds where they have been independently discovered: Computer Science,
Philosophical Logic (precisely, Modal Logic), Set Theory.
Bisimulation and bisimilarity are coinductive notions, and as such
are intimately related to ﬁxed points, in particular greatest ﬁxed points.
Therefore also the appearance of coinduction and ﬁxed points is dis-
cussed, though in this case only within Computer Science. The paper
ends with some historical remarks on the main ﬁxed-point theorems (such
as Knaster-Tarski) that underpin the ﬁxed-point theory presented.
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1 Introduction
Bisimulation and coinduction are generally considered as one of the most im-
portant contributions of Concurrency Theory to Computer Science. In concur-
rency, the bisimulation equality, called bisimilarity, is the most studied form of
behavioural equality for processes, and is widely used, for a number of reasons,
notably the following ones.
• Bisimilarity is accepted as the ﬁnest behavioural equivalence one would
like to impose on processes.
• The bisimulation proof method is exploited to prove equalities among pro-
cesses. This occurs even when bisimilarity is not the behavioural equiva-
lence chosen for the processes. For instance, one may be interested in trace
equivalence and yet use the bisimulation proof method since bisimilarity
implies trace equivalence.
• The eﬃciency of the algorithms for bisimilarity checking and the compo-
sitionality properties of bisimilarity are exploited to minimise the state-
space of processes.
• Bisimilarity, and variants of it such as similarity, are used to abstract from
certain details of the systems of interest. For instance, we may want to
prove behavioural properties of a server that do not depend on the data
that the server manipulates. Further, abstracting from the data may turn
an inﬁnite-state server into a ﬁnite one.
Bisimulation has also spurred the study of coinduction; indeed bisimilarity is
an example of a coinductive deﬁnition, and the bisimulation proof method an
instance of the coinduction proof method.
Bisimulation and, more generally, coinduction are employed today in a num-
ber of areas of Computer Science: functional languages, object-oriented lan-
guages, types, data types, domains, databases, compiler optimisations, program
2analysis, veriﬁcation tools, etc.. For instance, in Type Theory bisimulation and
coinductive techniques have been proposed: to prove the soundness of type sys-
tems [MT91]; to deﬁne the meaning of equality between (recursive) types and
then to axiomatise and prove such equalities [AC93, BH97]; to deﬁne coinductive
types and manipulate inﬁnite proofs in theorem provers [Coq93, Gim96].
Also, the development of Final Semantics [Acz88, Acz93, RT92, JR96], an
area of Mathematics based on coalgebras and category theory and used in the
semantics of programming languages, has been largely motivated by the interest
in bisimulation. Final Semantics also gives us a rich and deep perspective on
the meaning of coinduction and its duality with induction.
In this paper, we look at the origins of bisimulation (and bisimilarity). We
show that bisimulation has been discovered not only in Computer Science, but
also—and roughly at the same time—in other ﬁelds: Philosophical Logic (more
precisely, Modal Logic), and Set Theory. In each ﬁeld, we discuss the main
steps that led to the discovery, and introduce the people who made these steps
possible.
In Computer Science, and in Philosophical Logic, and in Set Theory, bisim-
ulation has been derived through reﬁnements of notions of morphism between al-
gebraic structures. Roughly, morphisms are maps that are “structure-preserving”.
The notion is therefore fundamental in all mathematical theories in which the
objects of study have some kind of structure, or algebra. The most basic forms
of morphism are the homomorphisms. These essentially give us a way of em-
bedding a structure (the source) into another one (the target), so that all the
relations in the source are present in the target. The converse however, need
not be true; for this, stronger notions of morphism are needed. One such no-
tion is isomorphism, which is however extremely strong—isomorphic structures
must be essentially the same, i.e., “algebraically identical”. It is a quest for
notions in between homomorphism and isomorphism that led to the discovery
of bisimulation.
The kind of structures studied in Computer Science, in Philosophical Logic,
and in Set Theory were forms of rooted directed graphs. On such graphs bisim-
ulation is coarser than graph isomorphism because, intuitively, bisimulation al-
lows us to observe a graph only through the movements that are possible along
its edges. By contrast, with isomorphisms the identity of the nodes is observ-
able too. For instance, isomorphic graphs have the same number of nodes, which
need not be the case for bisimilar graphs (bisimilarity on two graphs indicates
that their roots are related in a bisimulation).
The independent discovery of bisimulation in three diﬀerent ﬁelds suggests
that only limited exchanges and contacts among researchers existed at the time.
The common concept of bisimulation has somehow helped to improve this situa-
tion. An example of this are the advances in Set Theory and Computer Science
derived from Aczel’s work.
Bisimilarity and the bisimulation proof method represent examples of a coin-
ductive deﬁnition and the coinduction proof method, and as such are intimately
related to ﬁxed points, in particular greatest ﬁxed points. We therefore also dis-
cuss the introduction of ﬁxed points, and of coinduction. In this case, however,
3with a more limited breadth: we only consider Computer Science—ﬁxed points
have a much longer history in Mathematics—and we simply discuss the main
papers in the introduction of coinduction and ﬁxed-point theory in the ﬁeld. We
conclude with some historical remarks on the main ﬁxed-point theorems that
underpin all the ﬁxed-point theory presented.
In each section of the paper, we focus on the origins of the concept dealt
with in that section, and do not attempt to follow the subsequent developments.
The style of presentation is generally fairly informal, but—we hope—technical
enough to make the various contributions clear, so that the reader can appreciate
them.
Structure of the paper In Section 2 we recall basic notions and results,
whose history is then examined in the paper: bisimulation, bisimilarity, in-
ductive characterisations of bisimilarity, coinduction, ﬁxed-point theorems. In
Section 3 to 5 we examine the origins of bisimulation and bisimilarity in Modal
Logic, Computer Science, and Set Theory. In Section 6 we report on the in-
troduction of coinduction and ﬁxed points in Computer Science. Finally, in
Section 7, we discuss the ﬁxed-point theorems.
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2 Background
In this section we recall some basic notations, deﬁnitions, and results, including
the deﬁnition of bisimulation, that are important in the remainder of the paper.
2.1 Bisimulation
We present bisimulation on Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs) because these
are the most common structures on which bisimulation has been studied. LTSs
are essentially labelled directed graphs. Bisimulation can be deﬁned on vari-
ant structures, such as relational structures (i.e., unlabeled directed graphs) or
Kripke structures, in a similar way; we will meet some of the variants in the
following sections.
We let R range overrelations on sets, i.e., if ℘ denotes the powerset construct,
then a relation R on a set W is an element of ℘(W × W). The composition
of relations R1 and R2 is R1R2 (i.e., (s,s′) ∈ R1R2 holds if for some s′′,
both (s,s′′) ∈ R1 and (s′′,s′) ∈ R2 hold). We often use the inﬁx notation for
relations; hence s R t means (s,t) ∈ R.
4Deﬁnition 2.1 (Relational structures) A relational structure is a pair (W,T )
where W is a non-empty set called the domain of the structure, and T is a re-
lation on W.
We can think of LTSs as a kind of multi-relational structures.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Labelled Transition Systems) A Labelled Transition Sys-
tem is a triple (W,Act,{
a − → : a ∈ Act}) with domain W as above, set of labels
Act, and for each label a, a relation
a − → on W called the transition relation.
In the two deﬁnitions above, the elements of W will be called states or points,
sometimes even processes as this is the usual terminology in concurrency. We
use s,t to range over such elements, and µ to range over the labels in Act.
Following the inﬁx notation for relations, we write s
µ
− → t when (s,t) ∈
µ
− →; in
this case we call t a µ-derivative of s, or sometimes simply a derivative of s.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Bisimulation) A binary relation R on the states of an LTS
is a bisimulation if whenever s1 R s2:
• for all s′
1 with s1
µ
− → s′
1, there is s′
2 such that s2
µ
− → s′
2 and s′
1 R s′
2;
• the converse, on the transitions emanating from s2.
Bisimilarity, written ∼, is the union of all bisimulations; thus s ∼ t holds if
there is a bisimulation R with s R t.
The deﬁnition of bisimilarity has a strong impredicative ﬂavor, for bisimilarity
itself is a bisimulation and is therefore part of the union from which it is deﬁned.
Also, the deﬁnition immediately suggests a proof technique: to demonstrate that
s1 and s2 are bisimilar, ﬁnd a bisimulation relation containing the pair (s1,s2).
This is the bisimulation proof method.
We will not discuss here the eﬀectiveness of this proof method; the interested
reader may consult concurrency textbooks in which bisimilarity is taken as the
main behavioural equivalence for processes, such as [Mil89, SW01]. We wish
however to point out two features of the deﬁnition of bisimulation that make its
proof method practically interesting:
• the locality of the checks on the states;
• the lack of a hierarchy on the pairs of the bisimulation.
The checks are local because we only look at the immediate transitions that
emanate from the states. An example of a behavioural equality that is non-
local is trace equivalence (two states are trace equivalent if they can perform the
same sequences of transitions). It is non-local because computing a sequence of
transitions starting from a state s may require examining other states, diﬀerent
from s.
There is no hierarchy on the pairs of a bisimulation in that no temporal order
on the checks is required: all pairs are on a par. As a consequence, bisimilarity
5can be eﬀectively used to reason about inﬁnite or circular objects. This is in
sharp contrast with inductive techniques, that require a hierarchy, and that
therefore are best suited for reasoning about ﬁnite objects. For instance, here
is a deﬁnition of equality that is local but inherently inductive:
s1 = s2 if:
for all s′
1 with s1
µ
− → s′
1, there is s′
2 such that s2
µ
− → s′
2 and s′
1 = s′
2;
the converse, on the transitions from s2.
This deﬁnition requires a hierarchy, as the checks on the pair (s1,s2) must follow
those on derivative pairs such as (s′
1,s′
2). Hence the deﬁnition is ill-founded if
the state space of the derivatives reachable from (s1,s2) is inﬁnite or includes
loops.
In the paper we also sometimes mention simulations, which are “half bisim-
ulations”.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Simulation) A binary relation R on the states of an LTS is
a simulation if s1 R s2 implies that for all s′
1 with s1
µ
− → s′
1 there is s′
2 such
that s2
µ
− → s′
2 and s′
1 R s′
2. Similarity is the union of all simulations.
We have presented the standard deﬁnitions of bisimulation and bisimilarity.
A number of variants have been proposed and studied. For instance, on LTSs
in which labels have a structure, which may be useful when processes may ex-
change values in communications; or on LTSs equipped with a special action
to represent movements internal to processes, in which case one may wish to
abstract from such action in the bisimulation game yielding the so-called weak
bisimulations and weak bisimilarity. Examples of these kinds may be found, e.g.,
in [Mil89, SW01, AILS07, SKS07]. Also, we do not discuss in this paper en-
hancements of the bisimulation proof method, intended to relieve the amount of
work needed to prove bisimilarity results, such as bisimulation up-to techniques;
see, e.g., [Mil89, San98, Pou07].
2.2 Approximants of bisimilarity
We can approximate bisimilarity using the following inductively-deﬁned rela-
tions and their meet. Similar constructions can be given for similarity.
Deﬁnition 2.5 (Stratiﬁcation of bisimilarity) Let W be the states of an
LTS. We set:
• ∼0
def = W × W
• s ∼n+1 t, for n ≥ 0, if
1. for all s′ with s
µ
− → s′, there is t′ such that t
µ
− → t′ and s′ ∼n t′;
2. the converse, i.e., whenever for all t′ with t
µ
− → t′, there is s′ such
that s
µ
− → s′ and s′ ∼n t′.
6• ∼ω
def =
T
n≥0 ∼n
In general, ∼ω does not coincide with ∼, as the following example shows.
Example 2.6 Suppose a ∈ Act, and let a0 be a state with no transitions, aω a
state whose only transition is
aω a − → aω ,
and an, for n ≥ 1, states with only transitions
an a − → an−1 .
Also, let s,t be states with transitions
s
a − → a
n for all n ≥ 0
and
t
a − → an for all n ≥ 0
t
a − → aω
It is easy to prove, by induction on n, that, for all n, s ∼n t, hence also s ∼ω t.
However, it holds that s  ∼ t: the transition t
a − → aω can only be matched by s
with one of the transitions s
a − → an. But, for all n, we have aω  ∼ an, as only
from the former state n + 1 transitions are possible.
In order to reach ∼, in general we need to replace the ω-iteration that de-
ﬁnes ∼ω with a transﬁnite iteration, using the ordinal numbers. However, the
situation changes if the LTS is image-ﬁnite (or ﬁnite-branching), meaning that
for all s the set {s′ : s
µ
− → s′, for some µ} is ﬁnite. (In Example 2.6, the LTS
is not image-ﬁnite.) In this case, the natural numbers are suﬃcient: Indeed we
have:
Theorem 2.7 On image-ﬁnite LTSs, relations ∼ and ∼ω coincide.
2.3 Coinduction
Intuitively, a set A is deﬁned coinductively if it is the greatest solution of an
inequation of a certain form; then the coinduction proof principle just says that
any set that is a solution of the same inequation is contained in A. Dually, a set
A is deﬁned inductively if it is the least solution of an inequation of a certain
form, and the induction principle then says that any other set that is a solution
to the same equation contains A. Familiar inductive deﬁnitions and proofs can
be formalised in this way. To see how bisimulation and its proof method ﬁt
the coinductive schema, let (W,Act,{
a − → : a ∈ Act}) be an LTS, and consider
the function F∼ : ℘(W × W) → ℘(W × W) so deﬁned:
F∼(R) is the set of all pairs (s,t) such that:
1. for all s′ with s
µ
− → s′, there is t′ such that t
µ
− → t′ and s′ R t′.
72. for all t′ with t
µ
− → t′, there is s′ such that s
µ
− → s′ and s′ R t′.
We call F∼ the functional associated to bisimulation, for we have:
Proposition 2.8 1. ∼ is the greatest ﬁxed point of F∼;
2. ∼ is the largest relation R such that R ⊆ F∼(R); thus R ⊆ ∼ for all R
with R ⊆ F∼(R).
Proposition 2.8 is a simple application of ﬁxed-point theory, in particular
the Knaster-Tarski Theorem, that we discuss below. We recall that a complete
lattice is a partially ordered set with all joins (i.e., all its subsets have a supre-
mum, also called least upper bound); this implies that there are also all meets
(i.e., all subsets have an inﬁmum, also called greatest lower bound). Using ≤
to indicate the partial order, a point x in the lattice is a post-ﬁxed point of an
endofunction F on the lattice if x ≤ F(x); it is a pre-ﬁxed point if F(x) ≤ x.
Theorem 2.9 (Knaster-Tarski) On a complete lattice, a monotone endo-
function has a complete lattice of ﬁxed points. In particular the greatest ﬁxed
point of the function is the join of all its post-ﬁxed points, and the least ﬁxed
point is the meet of all its pre-ﬁxed points.
We deduce from the theorem that:
• a monotone endofunction on a complete lattice has a greatest ﬁxed point;
• for an endofunction F on a complete lattice the following rule is sound:
F monotone x ≤ F(x)
x ≤ gfp(F)
(1)
where gfp(F) indicates the greatest ﬁxed point of F.
The existence of the greatest ﬁxed point justiﬁes coinductive deﬁnitions, while
rule (1) expresses the coinduction proof principle, ` a la Knaster-Tarski.
Proposition 2.8 is a consequence of the Knaster-Tarski theorem because the
functional associated to bisimulation gives us precisely the clauses of a bisimu-
lation, and is monotone on the complete lattice of the relations on W × W, in
which the join is given by relational union, the meet by relational intersection,
and the partial order by relation inclusion:
Lemma 2.10 • R is a bisimulation iﬀ R ⊆ F∼(R);
• F∼ is monotone (that is, if R ⊆ S then also F∼(R) ⊆ F∼(S)).
For such functional F∼, (1) asserts that any bisimulation only relates pairs of
bisimilar states. Example 2.6 shows that ∼ω is not a ﬁxed point for it.
Also Theorem 2.7, about approximating bisimilarity using the natural num-
bers, can be seen as an application of ﬁxed-point theory, in which one uses
the extra hypothesis of cocontinuity of the functional. Let
T
denote the meet
operation of the complete lattice; then an endofunction on such a lattice is co-
continuous if for all sequences α0,α1 ... of decreasing points in the lattice (i.e.,
αi ≥ αi+1, for i ≥ 0) we have F(
T
i αi) =
T
i F(αi).
8Theorem 2.11 For a cocontinuous endofunction F on a complete lattice we
have:
gfp(F) =
\
n≥0
Fn(⊤)
where ⊤ is the top element of the lattice, and F n(⊤) indicates the n-th iteration
of F on ⊤:
F0(⊤)
def = ⊤
Fn+1(⊤)
def = F(F n(⊤))
The cocontinuity of the functional associated to bisimilarity is guaranteed by
the image-ﬁnite property of the LTS, and thus Theorem 2.7 becomes an instance
of Theorem 2.11.
Without cocontinuity, to reach the greatest ﬁxed point using inductively-
deﬁned relations we need to iterate over the transﬁnite ordinals, as the following
theorem shows.
Theorem 2.12 If F is a monotone endofunction on a complete lattice, then
there is an ordinal α of cardinality less than or equal to that of the lattice such
that for β ≥ α the greatest ﬁxed point of F is F β(⊤) where ⊤ is the top element
of the lattice and F λ(⊤), where λ is an ordinal, is so deﬁned:
F0(⊤)
def = ⊤
Fλ(⊤)
def = F(
T
β<λ Fβ(⊤)) for λ > 0
As the ordinals are linearly ordered, and each ordinal is either the successor
of another ordinal or the least upper bound of all its predecessors, the above
deﬁnition can also be given thus:
F0(⊤)
def = ⊤
Fλ+1(⊤)
def = F(F λ(⊤)) for a successor ordinal
Fλ(⊤)
def = F(
T
β<λ Fβ(⊤)) for a limit ordinal
Theorem 2.12 tells us that at some ordinal α the function reaches its greatest
ﬁxed point. On ordinals larger than α, of course, the function remains on such
ﬁxed point. Therefore essentially the theorem tells us that F λ(⊤) returns the
greatest ﬁxed point of F for all suﬃciently large ordinals λ. In case F is cocon-
tinuous, Theorem 2.11 assures us that we can take α to be the ﬁrst limit ordinal,
ω (not counting 0 as a limit ordinal). The property dual to cocontinuity, on
increasing sequences, least ﬁxed points and joins, is called continuity.1
Theorems 2.11 and 2.12 give us constructive proofs of the existence of greatest-
ﬁxed points. The constructions are indeed at the heart of the algorithms used
today for bisimilarity checking.
1In some textbooks, cocontinuitiy is called lower-continuity, the dual property upper-
continuity.
9Complete lattices are “dualisable” structures: we can reverse the partial
order and get another complete lattice. Thus the deﬁnitions and results above
about joins, post-ﬁxed points, greatest ﬁxed points, cocontinuity have a dual
in terms of meets, pre-ﬁxed points, least ﬁxed points, and continuity. As the
results we gave justify coinductive deﬁnitions and the coinductive proof method,
so the dual theorems can be used to justify familiar inductive deﬁnitions and
inductive proofs for sets. However, to go deeper into coinduction and to fully
appreciate the duality of concepts found in the theory of induction and in that of
coinduction, it can be useful to go beyond the simple ﬁxed-point theory above,
and use the theory of algebras and coalgebras [Acz88, Acz93, JR96, TP97]. The
ﬁxed-point approach outlined in this section will be however suﬃcient for this
paper.
Another well-known example of application of coinduction is in deﬁnition
and proofs involving divergence. Divergence represents an inﬁnite computation
and can be elegantly deﬁned coinductively; then the coinduction proof method
can be used to prove that speciﬁc computations diverge.
3 Bisimulation in Modal Logic
3.1 Modal logics
Philosophical Logic studies and applies logical techniques to problems of interest
to philosophers, somewhat similarly to what Mathematical Logic does for prob-
lems that interest mathematicians. Of course, the problems do not only concern
philosophers or mathematicians; for instance nowadays both philosophical and
mathematical logics have deep and important connections with Computer Sci-
ence.
Strictly speaking, in Philosophical Logic a modal logic is any logic that uses
modalities. A modality is an operator used to qualify the truth of a statement,
that is, it creates a new statement that makes an assertion about the truth of
the original statement. Originally, modal logic was just the logic of necessity
and possibility, to express assertions of the form “it is possible that”, or “it is
necessary that”. Nowadays it has a broader connotation, as the term is used
also to refer to other logics: temporal logics (also called tense logics), that talk
about future and past (to express assertions such as “it always will be that”,
or “it was the case that”); epistemic logics, that talk about the certainty of
sentences (to express assertions such as “it is certainly true that”, or “it may
be true that [given the available knowledge]”); deontic logics, that talk about
obligation and morality (to express assertions such as “it is obligatory that”,
“it is permitted that”, etc.); and so forth.
For the discussion below we use a simple modal language, deﬁned by means
of the usual operators of propositional logic, a set of proposition letters {pi}i∈I,
and a unary modal operator 3:
φ
def = p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | 3φ | ⊥
10where p is a proposition letter. The arguably simplest form of semantics for
modal languages is the Kripke semantics. Here, models are directed graphs
whose nodes are labelled with sets of proposition letters. Formally, a model is a
triple (W,T ,G) where (W,T ) is a relational structure (Deﬁnition 2.1; relational
structures are usually called frames in Modal Logic); and G is a function that
assigns to each point in W a set of proposition letters, to be thought of as the
atomic formulas that hold at that point. As usual for relations, we write s T t
if (s,t) ∈ T ; in this case we say that there is a transition between s and t.
The notion of satisfaction for a formula at a point t of a model M is deﬁned
inductively thus:
M,t |= p if p ∈ G(t)
M,t |= ⊥ never holds
M,t |= φ1 ∧ φ2 if both M,t |= φ1 and M,t |= φ2
M,t |= ¬φ if not M,t |= φ
M,t |= 3φ if for some s such that t T s we have M,s |= φ
Thus 3φ holds at t if φ holds in at least one of the successors of t; and p holds at
t if p is among the letters assigned to t; the interpretation of the other operators
is the standard one of propositional logic. While models are used to investigate
questions of satisfaction of formulas, relational structures are used for questions
of validity.
To keep things simple we have assumed a single transition relation T and a
single modality 3, but in fact one could have a set of modalities, say  a , where a
is taken from some special alphabet, and for each modality  a  a corresponding
transition relation Ta; thus Labelled Transition Systems become special cases
of models, namely models with a separate modality and transition relation for
each diﬀerent form of action, and without proposition letters. In the examples
we will give, when we do not mention proposition letters it is intended that no
proposition letters hold at the states under consideration. Further, we write
T M for the transition relation of a model M.
3.2 From homomorphism to p-morphism
Today, some of the most interesting results in the expressiveness of modal logics
rely on the notion of bisimulation. Bisimulation is indeed discovered in Modal
Logic when researchers begin to investigate seriously issues of expressiveness for
the logics, in the 1970s. For this, important questions tackled are: When is the
truth of a formula preserved when the model changes? Or, even better, under
which model constructions are modal formulas invariant? Which properties of
models can modal logics express? (When moving from a model M to another
model N, preserving a property means that if the property holds in M then it
holds also when one moves to N; the property being invariant means that also
the converse is true, that is, the property holds in M iﬀ it holds when one moves
to N.)
To investigate such questions, it is natural to start from the most basic
structure-preserving construction, that of homomorphism. A homomorphism
11from a model M to a model N is a function F from the points of M to the
points of N such that
• whenever a proposition letter holds at a point s of M then the same letter
also holds at F(s) in N;
• whenever there is a transition between two points s,s′ in M then there is
also a transition between F(s) and F(s′) in N.
Thus, contrasting homomorphism with bisimulation, we note that
(i) homomorphism is a functional, rather than relational, concept;
(ii) in the deﬁnition of homomorphism there is no back condition; i.e., the
reverse implication, from transitions in N to those in M, is missing.
Homomorphisms are too weak to respect the truth of modal formulas. That
is, a homomorphism H from a model M to a model N does not guarantee that if
a formula holds at a point t of M then the same formula also holds at H(t) in N.
For instance, consider a model M with just one point and no transitions, and a
model N with two points and transitions between them. A homomorphism can
send the point of M onto any of the points of N. The formula ¬3¬⊥, however,
which holds at points that have no transitions, will be true in M, and false in
N.
The culprit for the failure of homomorphisms is the lack of a back condition.
We can therefore hope to repair the invariance by adding some form of reverse
implication. There are two natural ways of achieving this:
1. turning the “implies” of the deﬁnition of homomorphism into an “iﬀ”
(that is, a propositional letter holds at s in M iﬀ it holds at F(s) in N;
and s T M s′ in M iﬀ F(s) T N F(s′) in N);
2. explicitly adding a back condition (that is, if in N there is a transition
F(s) T N t, for some point t, then in M there exists a point s′ such that
s T M s′ and t = F(s′).
Solution (1) is the requirement of strong homomorphisms. Solution (2) is ﬁrst
formalised by Krister Segerberg in his famous dissertation [Seg71], as the re-
quirement of p-morphisms.
Segerberg starts the study of morphisms between models of modal log-
ics that preserve the truth of formulas in [Seg68]. Initially, p-morphisms are
called pseudo-epimorphims [Seg68], and are indeed surjective mappings. Later
[Seg70, Seg71], the term is shortened to p-morphisms, and thereafter used to
denote also non-surjective mappings. A notion similar to p-morphisms had also
occurred earlier, in a work of Jongh and Troelstra [JT66], for certain surjective
mappings on partial orders that were called strongly isotone. These were in fact
essentially pseudo-epimorphisms on frames, rather than on models; they had
been used to study relationships between partial orders and algebraic models
of intuitionistic propositional logic. Sometimes, today, p-morphisms are called
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as the natural notion of homomorphism in Kripke models; indeed other reasons
make p-morphisms interesting for modal logics, for instance they are useful in
the algebraic semantics of modal logics (e.g., when relating modal algebras).
With either of the additions in (1) or (2), the invariance property holds:
modal formulas are invariant both under surjective strong homomorphisms and
under p-morphisms. Thus, if H is a surjective strong homomorphism, or a p-
morphism, from M to N, then for any point s in M and formula φ, we have
M,s |= φ iﬀ N,H(s) |= φ. (The surjective condition is necessary for strong
homomorphisms, but not for p-morphisms.)
As far as invariance is concerned, the surjective strong homomorphism con-
dition is certainly a very strong requirement—we are not far from isomorphism,
in fact (the only diﬀerence is injectivity of the function, but even when func-
tions are not injective only states with essentially the “same” transitions can be
collapsed, that is, mapped onto the same point). In contrast, p-morphisms are
much more interesting. Still, they do not capture all situations of invariance.
That is, there can be states s of a model M and t of a model N that satisfy
exactly the same modal formulas and yet there is no p-morphisms that take s
into t or vice versa.
3.3 Johan van Benthem
The next step is made by Johan van Benthem in his PhD thesis [Ben76] (the
book [Ben83] is based on the thesis), who generalises the directional relationship
between models in a p-morphism (the fact that a p-morphism is a function) to
a symmetric one. This leads to the notion of bisimulation, which van Benthem
calls p-relation. (Later [Ben84] he renames p-relations as zigzag relations.) On
Kripke models, a p-relation between models M and N is a total relation S on
the states of the models (the domain of S are the states of M and the codomain
the states of N) such that whenever v S t then: a propositional letter holds at
s iﬀ it holds at t; for all s′ with s T M s′ there is t′ such that t T N t′ and s′ S t′;
the converse of the previous condition, on the transitions from t.
To appreciate the diﬀerence between p-morphisms and p-relations, consider
the models in Figure 1 (where the letters are used to name the states, they
do not represent proposition letters—there are no proposition letters, in fact).
There is no p-morphisms from M to N: the image of t must be either v or w;
in any case, there is always a transition from u that s cannot match. We can
however establish a p-relation on the models, relating s with u, and t with both
v and w. (There is a p-morphism in the opposite direction, from N to M; but
the example could be developed a bit so that there is no p-morphisms in either
direction.)
Van Benthem deﬁnes p-relations while working on Correspondence Theory,
precisely the relationship between modal and classical logics. Van Benthem’s
objective is to characterise the fragment of ﬁrst-order logic that “corresponds”
to modal logic—an important way of measuring expressiveness. He gives a
sharp answer to the problem, via a theorem that is today called “van Benthem
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Characterisation Theorem”. We explain van Benthem’s result in some detail
because both its assertion and its proof are interesting.
Van Benthem is not the ﬁrst one to compare modal logic and ﬁrst-order
logic. There is a straightforward translation of modal logic into ﬁrst-order logic,
usually called the “standard translation” that had been known for a long time
(since the 1960s, at least). That such a translation should exist is by no means
surprising: Kripke models—the models of modal logic—can also be talked about
using classical logic. With ﬁrst-order logic, for instance, we simply need a
relational symbol to match the relations on the points of the model and a set of
predicates to match the proposition letters that hold at such points. Thus the
standard translation maps modal formulas to the formulas of the language FO
of ﬁrst-order logic that has equality, a binary relation U, and unary predicates
{Pi : pi is a proposition letter in the modal logic}. The translation, [|φ|], is
deﬁned as follows on the structure of φ:
[|p|]x
def = Px
[|⊥|]x
def = x  = x
[|¬φ|]x
def = ¬[|φ|]x
[|φ ∨ ψ|]x
def = [|φ|]x ∨ [|ψ|]x
[|3φ|]x
def = ∃y.(x U y ∧ [|φ|]y) with x  = y
The free variable x in [|φ|]x is needed for evaluation of the formula: the evaluation
of φ at a point t corresponds to the evaluation of [|φ|]x where t replaces x. Indeed
in any Kripke model, φ holds at a point t iﬀ [|φ|]x{t/x} holds. Note the translation
of the modality 3, which makes it explicit that a modal logic implicitly gives us a
form of quantiﬁcation, yet—in contrast with ﬁrst-order logic—the quantiﬁcation
is achieved without the use of variables.
Although known for a long time, the importance of the translation emerges
only in the 1970s, notably in works of Thomason [Tho72] and in those of van
Benthem mentioned above. Van Benthem Characterisation Theorem relates
modal logic to ﬁrst-order logic via the translation and bisimulation. In the
ﬁrst-order language FO deﬁned above, a formula A with one free variable, say
x, is invariant for bisimulations if the evaluation of A at bisimilar points is
always the same; that is, for all models M,N, and all states s in M and t in N,
and all bisimulations S between M and N such that s S t, we have M |= A{s/x}
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the usual manner of ﬁrst-order logics, when s is assigned to the free variable x;
similarly for N |= A{t/x}). In nowadays’s terminology, van Benthem’s theorem
says: a ﬁrst-order formula A containing one free variable is equivalent to the
standard translation of a modal formula iﬀ A is invariant for bisimulations.
That is, modal logic is the fragment of ﬁrst-order logic whose formulas have one
free variable and are invariant for bisimulation.
The standard translation therefore deﬁnes a proper fragment of ﬁrst-order
logic (not just syntactically, but also semantically). Indeed, with ﬁrst-order logic
one can deﬁne very intensional properties of states in the models. For instance
the formula ∃y.((x  = y)∧(xU y)∧(yU x)) says that there are 2 connected points,
and the formula xU x says that there is at least one state with a transition
onto itself. These properties can distinguish states that are bisimilar. For
example the second formula distinguishes a state that has a transition onto
itself from a bisimilar state that has non-terminating sequences of transitions
but no transitions onto itself. Hence the formulas are not deﬁnable in modal
logic since, as van Benthem’s theorem shows, modal logic respects bisimulation.
It is not so surprising that modal logic should correspond to a proper fragment
of ﬁrst-order logic. The strength of van Benthem’s theorem is that it tells us
precisely what this fragment is.
The actual assertion in van Benthem’s original theorem is a bit diﬀerent: in
place of “invariant for bisimulations” van Benthem required that the formula
is “invariant for p-relations and generated submodels”. The reason for this is
that p-relations are “total bisimulations”, not arbitrary ones. Hence in general
it is not possible to establish a p-relation between a model and submodels of it.
Thus van Benthem, who heavily plays with models and submodels in the proof,
needs a further restriction for the theorem to be true, namely the invariance
for generated submodels. (Intuitively, M is a generated submodel of a model
N if M is a subgraph of N that is transition closed, i.e., all transitions in N
emanating from a point s that is also in M are also transitions of M.) Generated
submodels represent an important construction on models of modal logics, and
the property of invariance under generated submodels had already been used
by other researchers before van Benthem (for instance, Feferman and Kreisel,
in the 1960s).
The original proof of the theorem is also interesting. The implication from
left to right is easy: one shows that modal formulas are invariant for bisimulation
proceeding by induction on the depth of the formulas. The opposite implication
is the diﬃcult one. Here a key part of the proof is to show that a point s in
a model M and a point t in a model N satisfy the same modal formulas if
there are extensions M′ and N′ of the models M and N in which s and t are
bisimilar. The extensions are obtained as the limits of appropriate elementary
chains of models, starting from the original models. Further, the embedding
of the original models into the limits of the chains preserves modal formulas.
The reason why it is necessary to move from the original models M and N to
the extended models M′ and N′ is that on arbitrary models two points may
satisfy the same set of formulas without being bisimilar. This may occur if
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N′ are “saturated”, in the sense that they have “enough points”. On such
models, two points satisfy the same modal formulas iﬀ they are bisimilar. As all
image-ﬁnite models are saturated, van Benthem’s construction also yields the
familiar Hennessy-Milner Theorem for modal logics [HM85] (an earlier version
is [HM80]): on image-ﬁnite models, two points are bisimilar iﬀ they satisfy the
same modal formulas. Saturated models need not be image-ﬁnite, however,
thus van Benthem’s construction is somewhat more general. Note that the
need for saturation also would disappear if the logic allowed some inﬁnitary
constructions, for instance inﬁnite conjunction.
Van Benthem does not isolate the above part of the proof as a separate lemma
and this may have contributed to the result remaining unknown to researchers in
other ﬁelds. (The Hennessy-Milner Theorem, for instance, appears some years
later.)
For more details on van Benthem’s proof, see [Ben76, Ben83]; in modern
textbooks, such as [BRV01], the proof is sometimes presented in a diﬀerent way,
by directly appealing to the existence of saturated models; however elementary
chains are employed to show the existence of such saturated models.
After van Benthem’s theorem, bisimulation has been used extensively in
Modal Logic, for instance, to analyze the expressive power of various dialects
of modal logics, to understand which properties of models can be expressed in
modal logics, to deﬁne operations on models that preserve the validity of modal
formulas.
3.4 Discussion
In Philosophical Logic we see, historically, the ﬁrst appearance of the notion
of bisimulation. We do not ﬁnd here, however, coinduction, at least not in
an explicit way. Thus total relations between models that represent bisimula-
tions are deﬁned—the p-relations—but there is no explicit deﬁnition and use of
bisimilarity. Similarly no links are made to ﬁxed-point theory.
In retrospective, today we could say that bisimulation, as a means of charac-
terising equivalence of modal properties “was already there” in the Ehrenfeucht-
Fra¨ ıss´ e games. In the 1950s, Roland Fra¨ ıss´ e [Fra53] gave an algebraic formu-
lation, as a weak form of isomorphism, of indistinguishability by formulas of
ﬁrst-order logic. Andrzej Ehrenfeucht [Ehr61] then extended the result and
gave it a more intuitive game theoretic formulation, in what is now called the
Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ ıss´ e games. Such games are today widely used in Computer
Science, notably in Logic, Finite Model Theory, but also in other areas such as
Complexity Theory, following Immerman [Imm82]. It is clear that the restric-
tion of the Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ ıss´ e games to modal logic leads to game formulations
of bisimulation. However, such a connection has been made explicit only after
the discovery of bisimulation. See for instance Thomas [Tho93].
164 Bisimulation in Computer Science
4.1 Algebraic theory of automata
In Computer Science, the search for the origins of bisimulation takes us back to
the algebraic theory of automata, well-established in the 1960s. A good reference
is Ginzburg’s book [Gin68]. Homomorphisms can be presented on diﬀerent forms
of automata. From the bisimulation perspective, the most interesting notions
are formulated on Mealy automata. In these automata, there are no initial
and ﬁnal states; however, an output is produced whenever an input letter is
consumed. Thus Mealy automata can be compared on the set of output strings
produced. Formally, a Mealy automaton is a 5-tuple (W,Σ,Θ,T ,O) where
• W is the ﬁnite set of states;
• Σ is the ﬁnite set of inputs;
• Θ is a ﬁnite set of outputs;
• T is the transition function, that is a set of partial functions {Ta : a ∈ Σ}
from W to W;
• O is the output function, that is, a set of partial functions {Oa : a ∈ Σ}
from W to Θ.
The output string produced by a Mealy automaton is the translation of the input
string with which the automaton was fed; of course the translation depends
on the state on which the automaton is started. Since transition and output
functions of a Mealy automaton are partial, not all input strings are consumed
entirely.
Homomorphism is deﬁned on Mealy automata following the standard notion
in algebra, e.g., in group theory: a mapping that commutes with the operations
deﬁned on the objects of study. Below, if A is an automaton, then W A is the
set of states of A, and similarly for other symbols. As we deal with partial
functions, it is convenient to view these as relations, and thereby use for them
relational notations. Thus fg is the composition of the two function f and g
where f is used ﬁrst (that is, (fg)(a) = g(f(a))); for this, one requires that the
codomain of f be included in the domain of g. Similarly, f ⊆ g means that
whenever f is deﬁned then so is g, and they give the same result.
A homomorphism from the automaton A to the automaton B is a surjective
function F from W A to W B such that for all a ∈ Σ:
1. T A
a F ⊆ FT B
a (condition on the states); and
2. OA
a ⊆ FOB
a (condition on the outputs).
(We assume here for simplicity that the input and output alphabets are the
same, otherwise appropriate coercion functions would be needed.)
At the time (the 1960s), homomorphism and alike notions are all expressed
in purely algebraic terms. Today we can make an operational reading of them,
17which for us is more enlightening. Writing s
a
→
b t if the automaton, on state s
and input a, produces the output b and evolves into the state t, and assuming
for simplicity that OA
a and T A
a are undeﬁned exactly on the same points, the
two conditions above become:
• for all s,s′ ∈ W A, if s
a
→
b s′ then also F(s)
a
→
b F(s′).
Homomorphisms are used in that period to study a number of properties of
automata. For instance, minimality of an automaton becomes the condition
that the automaton has no proper homomorphic image. Homomorphisms are
also used to compare automata. Mealy automata are compared using the notion
of covering (written ≤): A ≤ B (read “automaton B covers automaton A”) if
B can do, statewise, at least all the translations that A does. That is, there
is a total function ψ from the states of A to the states of B such that, for all
states s of A, all translations performed by A when started in s can also be
performed by B when started in ψ(s). Note that B can however have states
with a behaviour completely unrelated to that of any state of A; such states of
B will not be the image of states of A. If both A ≤ B and B ≤ A hold, then
the two automata are deemed equivalent.
Homomorphism implies covering, i.e., if there is a homomorphism from A
to B then A ≤ B. The converse result is (very much) false. The implication
becomes stronger if one uses weak homomorphisms. These are obtained by
relaxing the functional requirement of homomorphism into a relational one.
Thus a weak homomorphism is a total relation R on W A × W B such that for
all a ∈ Σ:
1. R−1T A
a ⊆T B
a R−1 (condition on the states); and
2. R−1OA
a ⊆ OB
a (condition on the outputs).
where relational composition, inverse, and inclusion are deﬁned in the usual
way for relations (and functions are taken as special forms of relations). In an
operational interpretation as above, the conditions give:
• whenever s R t and s
a
→
b s′ hold in A, then there is t′ such that t
a
→
b t′
holds in B and s′ R t′.
(On the correspondence between the algebraic and operational deﬁnitions, see
also Remark 4.1 below.) Weak homomorphism reminds us of the notion of simu-
lation for Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs). The former is however stronger,
because the relation R is required to be total. (Also, in automata theory, the
set of states and the sets of input and output symbols are required to be ﬁnite,
but this diﬀerence is less relevant.)
Remark 4.1 To understand the relationship between weak homomorphisms
and simulations, we can give an algebraic deﬁnition of simulation on LTSs,
taking these to be triples (W,Σ,{Ta : a ∈ Σ}) whose components have the
same interpretation as for automata. A simulation between two LTSs A and B
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Figure 2: On homomorphisms and weak homomorphisms
becomes a relation R on W A × W B such that, for all a ∈ Σ, condition (1) of
weak homomorphism holds, i.e.
• R−1T A
a ⊆T B
a R−1
This is precisely the notion of simulation deﬁned operationally in Deﬁnition 2.4.
Indeed, given a state t ∈ W B and a state s′ ∈ W A, we have tR−1T A
a s′ whenever
there is s ∈ W A such that s
a − → s′. Then, requiring that the pair (t,s′) is also
in T B
a R−1 is the demand that there is t′ such that t
a − → t′ and s′ R t′. 2
As homomorphisms, so weak homomorphisms imply covering. The result for
weak homomorphism is stronger as the homomorphisms are strictly included in
the weak homomorphisms. An example of the strictness is given in Figure 2,
where the states si belong to an automaton and the states ti to another one,
there are two input letters a and b, and for simplicity we ignore the automata
outputs. We cannot establish a homomorphism from the automaton on the left
to the automaton on the right, since a homomorphism must be surjective. Even
leaving the surjective condition aside, a homomorphism cannot be established
because the functional requirement prevents us from relating s3 with both t3
and t4. By contrast, a weak homomorphism exists, relating s1 with t1, s2 with
t2, and s3 with both t3 and t4.
As weak homomorphisms are total relations, however, the converse is still
false: covering does not imply weak homomorphism. Indeed I have not found,
in the literature of that time, characterisations of covering, or equivalence, in
terms of notions akin to homomorphism. Such characterisations would have
taken us closer to the idea of bisimulation.
In conclusion: in the algebraic presentation of automata in the 1960s we ﬁnd
concepts that remind us of bisimulation, or better, simulation. However there
are noticeable diﬀerences, as we have outlined above. But the most important
diﬀerence is due to the fact that the objects are deterministic. To see how signif-
icant this is, consider the operational reading of weak homomorphism, namely
“whenever s R t ... then there is t′ such that....”. As automata are deterministic,
the existential in front of t′ does not play a role. Thus the alternation of univer-
sal and existential quantiﬁers—a central aspect of the deﬁnitions of bisimulation
and simulation—does not really show up on deterministic automata.
194.2 Robin Milner
Decisive progress towards bisimulation is made by Robin Milner in the 1970s.
Milner transplants the idea of weak homomorphism into the study of the be-
haviour of programs in a series of papers in the early 1970s ([Mil70, Mil71a,
Mil71b], with [Mil71b] being a synthesis of the previous two). He studies pro-
grams that are sequential, imperative, and that may not terminate. He works
on the comparisons among such programs. The aim is to develop techniques for
proving the correctness of programs, and for abstracting from irrelevant details
so that it is clear when two programs are realisations of the same algorithm.
In short, the objective is to understand when and why two programs can be
considered “intensionally” equivalent.
To this end, Milner proposes—appropriately adapting it to his setting—the
algebraic notion of weak homomorphism that we have described in Section 4.1.
He renames weak homomorphism as simulation, a term that better conveys the
idea of the application in mind. Although the deﬁnition of simulation is still
algebraic, Milner now clearly spells out its operational meaning. But perhaps
the most important contribution in his papers is the proof technique associated
to simulation that he strongly advocates. This techniques amounts to exhibiting
the set of pairs of related states, and then checking the simulation clauses on
each pair. The strength of the technique is precisely the locality of the checks
that have to be made, in the sense given to locality in Section 2.1. The tech-
nique is proposed to prove not only results of simulation, but also results of in-
put/output correctness for programs, as a simulation between programs implies
appropriate relationships on their inputs and outputs. Besides the algebraic
theory of automata, other earlier works that have been inﬂuential for Milner
are those on program correctness, notably Floyd [Flo67], Manna [Man69], and
Landin [Lan69], who pioneers the algebraic approach to programs.
Milner’s simulation is used by other authors, notably by Tony Hoare, in a
paper [Hoa72] widely cited in the literature on programming languages, espe-
cially the object-oriented ones. Hoare uses simulation as a basis for a method
of proving correctness of concrete representations of program data with respect
to abstract versions of them.
Formally, however, Milner’s simulation remains the same as weak homomor-
phism and as such it is not today’s simulation. Programs for Milner are de-
terministic, with a total transition function, and these hypotheses are essential.
Non-deterministic and concurrent programs or, more generally, programs whose
computations are trees rather than sequences, are mentioned in the conclusions
for future work. It is quite possible that if this challenge had been quickly taken
up, then today’s notion of simulation (or even bisimulation) would have been
discovered much earlier.
Milner himself, later in the 1970s, does study concurrency very intensively,
but under a very diﬀerent perspective: he abandons the view of parallel pro-
grams as objects with an input/output behaviour akin to functions, in favor
of the view of parallel programs as interactive objects. This leads Milner to
develop a new theory of processes and a calculus—CCS—in which the notion of
20behavioural equivalence between processes—observational equivalence—is fun-
damental. Milner however keeps, from his earlier works, the idea of ”locality”,
that is, the interest in notions of equivalence in which outcomes are local to
states, rather than global to programs like their traces.
The behavioural equivalence that Milner puts forward, and that is prominent
in the ﬁrst book on CCS [Mil80], is inductively deﬁned. It is the stratiﬁcation
of bisimilarity, ∼ω, that we discuss in Section 2.2. Technically, in contrast with
weak homomorphisms, ∼ω has also the reverse implication (on the transitions
of the second components of the pairs in the relation), and can be used on non-
deterministic structures. The addition of a reverse implication was not obvious.
For instance, a natural alternative would have been to maintain an asymmetric
basic deﬁnition, possibly reﬁne it, and then take the induced equivalence closure
to obtain a symmetric relation (if needed). Indeed, among the main behavioural
equivalences in concurrency—there are several of them, see [Gla93, Gla90])—
bisimulation is the only one that is not naturally obtained as the equivalence-
closure of a preorder (which incidentally also explains why giving denotational
interpretations of bisimulation can be hard).
With Milner’s advances, the notion of bisimulation is almost there: it re-
mained to turn an inductive deﬁnition into a coinductive one. This will be
David Park’s contribution.
It is worth pointing out that, towards the end of the 1970s, homomorphisms-
like notions appear in other attempts at establishing “simulations”, or even
“equivalences”, between concurrent models—usually variants of Petri Nets. Good
examples are John S. Gourlay, William C. Rounds, and RichardStatman [GRS79]
and Kurt Jensen [Jen80], which develop previous work by Daniel Brand [Bra78]
and Y. S. Kwong [Kwo77]. Gourlay, Rounds, and Statman’s homomorphisms
(called contraction) relate an abstract system with a more concrete realisation of
it—in other words, a speciﬁcation with an implementation. Jensen’s proposal
(called simulation), which is essentially the same as Kwong’s strict reduction
[Kwo77], is used to compare the expressiveness of diﬀerent classes of Petri Nets.
The homomorphisms in both papers are stronger than today’s simulation or
bisimulation; for instance they are functions rather than relations. Interestingly,
in both cases there are forms of “reverse implications” on the correspondences
between the transitions of related states. Thus these homomorphisms, but es-
pecially those in [GRS79], remind us of bisimulation, at least in the intuition
behind it. In [GRS79] and [Jen80], as well as other similar works of that period,
the homomorphisms are put forward because they represent conditions suﬃcient
to preserve certain important properties (such as Church-Rosser and deadlock
freedom). In contrast with Milner, little emphasis is given to the proof technique
based on local checks that they bear upon. For instance the deﬁnitions of the
homomorphisms impose correspondence on sequences of actions from related
states.
214.3 David Park
In 19802 Milner returns to Edinburgh after a six-month appointment at Aarhus
University, and completes his ﬁrst book on CCS3. Towards the end of that year,
David Park begins a sabbatical in Edinburgh, and stays at the top ﬂoor of
Milner’s house.
Park is one of the top experts in ﬁxed-point theory at the time. He makes the
ﬁnal step in the discovery of bisimulation precisely guided by ﬁxed-point theory.
Park notices that the inductive notion of equivalence that Milner is using for his
CCS processes is based on a monotone functional overa complete lattice. And by
adapting an example by Milner, he sees that Milner’s equivalence is not a ﬁxed
point for the functional, and that therefore the functional is not cocontinuous.
He then deﬁnes bisimilarity as the greatest ﬁxed point of the functional, and
derives the bisimulation proof method from the theory of greatest ﬁxed points.
Further, Park knows that, to obtain the greatest ﬁxed point of the functional in
an inductive way, the ordinals and transﬁnite induction, rather then the naturals
and standard induction, are needed (see also the discussion on Theorem 2.12
in Section 7). Milner immediately and enthusiastically adopts Park’s proposal,
and in the years to come makes it popular and the cornerstone of the theory of
CCS [Mil89]. Here is the discovery of bisimulation, and the choice of the name
for it, in Milner’s own words:
He [i.e., David Park] came down during breakfast one morning car-
rying my CCS book and said ”there’s something wrong!”. So I pre-
pared to defend myself. He pointed out the non coinductive way
that I had set up observation equivalence, as the limit of a decreas-
ing ω-chain of relations, which didn’t quite reach the maximal ﬁxed
point.
After about 10 minutes I realised he was right, and through that day
I got excited about the coinductive proof technique.
That was what David meant by ”something’s wrong”. Not only had
I missed the (ﬁxed!) point—which I had realised—but also my proof
technique (involving induction on the iteration of the functions) for
establishing instances of the equivalences was clumsy. I immediately
saw that he had liberated me from a misconception, and that the
whole theory was going to look very much better by using maximal
ﬁxed points and (what I now recognise as) coinduction. [...]
That same day we went for a walk in the hills around Edinburgh, and
the express purpose was to agree what the pre-ﬁxed points and the
maximal ﬁxed point should be called. We thought of a lot of words;
David at one point liked ”mimicry”, which I vetoed. I think ”bisim-
ulation” was my suggestion; in any case, we both liked it, partly
because we could use that word for the pre-ﬁxed points and ”bisim-
ilarity” for the maximal ﬁxed point itself. I think David demurred
2,
3The ﬁrst part of this section is based on personal communications with R. Milner.
22because there are ﬁve syllables; but we then thought that they were
a lot easier to pronounce than the three syllables of ”mimicry”!
Milner knew that ∼ω is not invariant under transitions. Indeed he is not so
much struck by the diﬀerence between ∼ω and bisimilarity as behavioural equiv-
alences, as the processes exhibiting such diﬀerences can be considered rather
artiﬁcial. What excites him is the coinductive proof technique for bisimilarity.
Both bisimilarity and ∼ω are rooted in the idea of locality, but the coinductive
method of bisimilarity further facilitates proofs.
In Computer Science, the standard reference for bisimulation and the bisim-
ulation proof method is Park’s paper “Concurrency on Automata and Inﬁnite
Sequences” [Par81a] (one of the most quoted papers in concurrency). While the
reference to Park is justiﬁed, mentions of that particular paper can be ques-
tioned.
Park’s discovery is only partially reported in [Par81a]. The main topic of that
paper is a diﬀerent one, namely omega-regular languages (extensions of regular
languages containing also inﬁnite sequences) and operators for fair concurrency.
And the main contributions, as claimed by Park, are: characterisations of these
languages as sets of recursive equations involving minimal and maximal ﬁxed
points, something fairly novel at the time (Park in fact had already proposed
similar constructions in previous years, see for instance [Par79]); characterisa-
tions of these languages as the languages accepted by certain variants of B¨ uchi
automata (the main diﬀerence over B¨ uchi automata is that Park’s automata
also recognise ﬁnite words, but this does not aﬀect much of the theory of the
automata); properties of closure of the languages under a fair-concurrency op-
erator.
Bisimulation appears at the end, as a secondary contribution, as a proof
technique for trace equivalence on automata. Park himself does not seem to
believe much in it. He writes, for instance:
This provides motivation to be interested in proof principles for au-
tomata such as those involved here [cf: bisimulation] even though
their utility for the purposes of operational semantics of programs
is obviously limited.
Bisimulation is ﬁrst given on ﬁnite automata, but only as a way of introduc-
ing the concept on the B¨ uchi-like automata investigated in the paper. Here,
bisimulation has additional clauses that make it non-transitive and diﬀerent
from the deﬁnition of bisimulation we know today. Further, bisimilarity and
the coinduction proof method are not mentioned in the paper.
Indeed, Park never writes a paper to report on his ﬁndings about bisimula-
tion. It is possible that this does not appear to him a contribution important
enough to warrant a paper: he considers bisimulation a variant of the earlier
notion of simulation by Milner [Mil70, Mil71b]; and it is not in Park’s style
to write many papers. The best account I have found of Park’s discovery of
bisimulation are the summary and the slides of his talk at the 1981 Workshop
on the Semantics of Programming Languages [Par81b].
234.4 Discussion
In Computer Science, the move from homomorphism to bisimulation follows
somehow an opposite path with respect to Modal Logic: ﬁrst homomorphisms
are made relational, then they are made symmetric, by adding a reverse impli-
cation.
It remains puzzling to me why bisimulation has been discovered so late
in Computer Science. For instance, in the 1960s weak homomorphism is well-
known in automata theory and, as discussed in Section 4.1, this notion is not that
far from simulation. Another emblematic example, again from automata theory,
is given by the algorithm for minimisation of deterministic automata, already
known in the 1950s [Huf54, Moo56] (also related to this is the Myhill-Nerode
theorem [Ner58]). The aim of the algorithm is to ﬁnd an automaton equivalent
to a given one but minimal in the number of states. The algorithm proceeds by
progressively constructing a relation S with all pairs of non-equivalent states. It
roughly goes as follows. First step (a) below is applied, to initialise S; then step
(b), where new pairs are added to S, is iterated until a ﬁxed point is reached,
i.e., no further pairs can be added.
a. For all states s,t,: if s ﬁnal and t is not, or vice versa, then s S t
b. For all states s,t, such that ¬(s S t): if there is a such that Ta(s) S Ta(t)
then s S t
The ﬁnal relation gives all pairs of non-equivalent states. Then its complement,
say S, gives the equivalent states. In the minimal automaton, the states in the
same equivalence class for S are collapsed into a single state.
The algorithm strongly reminds us of the Paige-Tarjan’s partition reﬁnement
algorithm [PT87], the best known algorithm for computing bisimilarity and for
minimisation modulo bisimilarity. Indeed, the complement relation S that one
wants to ﬁnd has a natural coinductive deﬁnition, as a form of bisimilarity,
namely the largest relation R such that
1. if s R t then either both s and t are ﬁnal or neither is;
2. for each a, if s R t then Ta(s) R Ta(t).
Further, any relation R that satisﬁes the conditions (1) and (2)—that is, any
bisimulation—only relates pairs of equivalent states and can therefore be used
to determine equivalence of speciﬁc states.
The above deﬁnitions and algorithm are for deterministic automata. Bisim-
ulation would have been interesting also on non-deterministic automata. Al-
though on such automata bisimilarity does not coincide with trace equivalence—
the standard equality on automata—at least bisimilarity implies trace equiva-
lence and the algorithms for bisimilarity have a better complexity (P-complete
[ABGS91, BGS92], rather than PSPACE-complete [MS72, KS90]).
245 Set Theory
In Mathematics, bisimulation and concepts similar to bisimulation are formu-
lated in the study of properties of extensionality of models. Extensionality
guarantees that equal objects cannot be distinguished within the given model.
When the structure of the objects, or the way in which the objects are supposed
to be used, are non-trivial, the “correct” notion of equality may be non-obvious.
This is certainly the case for non-well-founded sets, as they are objects with an
inﬁnite depth, and indeed most of the developments in Set Theory towards
bisimulation are made in a line of work on the foundations of theories of non-
well-founded sets. Bisimulation is derived from the notion of isomorphism (and
homomorphism), intuitively with the objective of obtaining relations coarser
than isomorphism but still with the guarantee that related sets have “the same”
internal structure.
Bisimulation is ﬁrst introduced by Forti and Honsell and, independently,
by Hinnion, around the same time (beginning of the 1980s). It is recognised
and becomes important with the work of Aczel and Barwise. Some earlier
constructions, however, have a clear bisimulation ﬂavor, notably Mirimanoﬀ’s
isomorphism at the beginning of the 20th century.
5.1 Non-well-founded sets
Non-well-founded sets are, intuitively, sets that are allowed to contain them-
selves. As such they violate the axiom of foundation, according to which the
membership relation on sets does not give rise to inﬁnite descending sequences
...An ∈ An−1 ∈ ... ∈ A1 ∈ A0 .
For instance, a set Ω which satisﬁes the equation Ω = {Ω} is circular and as such
non-well-founded. A set can also be non-well-founded without being circular;
this can happen if there is an inﬁnite membership chain through a sequence of
sets all diﬀerent from each other.
If the axiom of foundation is used, the sets are well-founded. On well-founded
sets the notion of equality is expressed by Zermelo’s extensionality axiom: two
sets are equal if they have exactly the same elements. In other words, a set
is precisely determined by its elements. This is very intuitive and naturally
allows us to reason on equality proceeding by (transﬁnite) induction on the
membership relation. For instance, we can thus establish that the relation of
equality is unique. Non-well-founded sets, by contrast, may be inﬁnite in depth,
and therefore inductive arguments may not be applicable. For instance, consider
the sets A and B deﬁned via the equations A = {B} and B = {A}. If we try
to establish that they are equal via the extensionality axiom we end up with a
tautology (“A and B are equal iﬀ A and B are equal”) that takes us nowhere.
Diﬀerent formulations of equality on non-well-founded sets appear during
the 20th century, together with proposals for axioms of anti-foundation.
255.2 The stratiﬁed approach to set theory
The ﬁrst axiomatisation of set theory by Ernst Zermelo in 1908 [Zer08] has
seven axioms, among which is the axiom of extensionality. However, it has no
axioms of foundation, and the possibility of having circular sets is in fact left
open (page 263, op. cit.).
In the same years, Bertrand Russell strongly rejects all deﬁnitions that can
involve forms of circularity (“whatever involves all of a collection must not be one
of the collection”, in one of Russell’s formulations [Rus08]). He favors a theory
of types that only allows stratiﬁed constructions, where objects are hereditarily
constructed, starting from atoms or primitive objects at the bottom and then
iteratively moving upward through the composite objects. A preliminary version
of the theory is announced by Russell already in 1903 [Rus03, Appendix B]; more
complete and mature treatments appear in 1908 [Rus08] and later, in 1910, 1912,
1913, in the monumental work with Alfred North Whitehead [RW13].
Russell’s approach is followed by the main logicians of the ﬁrst half of the
20th century, including Zermelo himself, Abraham Fraenkel, Thoralf Skolem,
Johann von Neumann, Kurt G¨ odel, Paul Bernays. Their major achievements
include the formulation of the axiom of foundation, and the proofs of its con-
sistency and independence. An axiom of foundation is deemed necessary so
to have a “canonical” universe of sets. Without foundation, diﬀerent inter-
pretations are possible, some including circular sets. This possibility is clearly
pointed out as a weakness by Skolem [Sko23], and by Fraenkel [Fra22], where
circular sets (precisely, Mirimanoﬀ’s “ensembles extraordinaires”, see below) are
labelled as “superﬂuous”. It will be formally proved by Bernays only in 1954
[Ber54] that the existence of circular sets does not lead to contradictions in the
Zermelo-Fraenkel system without axiom of foundation.
Remark 5.1 The axiom of foundation forces the universe of sets in which the
other axioms (the basic axioms) should be interpreted to be the smallest possible
one; i.e., to be an “inductive universe”. By contrast, axioms of anti-foundation
lead to the largest possible universe, i.e., a “coinductive universe”. Indeed,
referring to the algebraic/coalgebraic interpretation of induction/coinduction,
the foundation axiom can be expressed as a requirement that the universe of sets
should be an initial algebra for the powerset functor, whereas anti-foundation
(as in Forti and Honsell, Aczel, and Barwise) can be expressed as a requirement
that the universe should be a ﬁnal coalgebra for the same functor. The former
is an inductive deﬁnition of the universe, whereas the latter is a coinductive
one. 2
The motivations for formalising and studying the stratiﬁed approach advo-
cated by Russell were strong at the beginning of the 20th century. The discovery
of paradoxes such as Burali-Forti’s and Russell’s had made the set theory studied
by Cantor and Frege shaky, and circularity—with no distinction of cases—was
generally perceived as the culprit for these as well as for paradoxes known in
other ﬁelds. Further, the stratiﬁed approach was in line with common sense and
26perception (very important in Russell’s conception of science), which denies the
existence of circular objects.
The stratiﬁed approach remains indeed the only approach considered (in
Logics and Set Theory), up to roughly the 1960s; with the exception of Mi-
rimanoﬀ and Finsler that we discuss below. The stratiﬁed approach has also
inspired—both in the name and in the method—type theory in Computer Sci-
ence, notably in the works of Church, Scott, and Martin-L¨ of. It will be ﬁrst
disputed by Jean-Yves Girard and John Reynolds, in the 1970s, with the intro-
duction of impredicative polymorphism.
5.3 Non-well-founded sets and extensionality
Dimitry Mirimanoﬀ ﬁrst introduces in 1917 the distinction between well-founded
and non-well-founded sets, the “ensembles ordinaires et extraordinaires” in Mi-
rimanoﬀ’s words [Mir17a] (on the same topic are also the two successive papers
[Mir17b] and [Mir20]). Mirimanoﬀ realises that Zermelo’s set theory admitted
sophisticated patterns of non-well-foundedness, beyond the “simple” circulari-
ties given by self-membership as in the purely reﬂexive set Ω = {Ω}. In [Mir17b],
Mirimanoﬀ also tries to give an intuition for the non-well-founded sets; he re-
calls the cover of a children book he had seen, with the image of two children
looking at the cover of a book, which in turn had the image of two children, in
a supposedly inﬁnite chain of nested images.
Mirimanoﬀ deﬁnes an interesting notion of isomorphism between sets, that
we report in Section 5.8. Mirimanoﬀ does not however go as far as proposing an
axiom of extensionality more powerful than Zermelo’s. This is ﬁrst attempted
by Paul Finsler, in 1926 [Fin26]. Finsler presents 3 axioms for a universe of sets
equipped with the membership relation. The second one is an extensionality ax-
iom, stipulating that isomorphic sets are equal. Finsler’s notion of isomorphism
between two sets X and Y —which is diﬀerent from Mirimanoﬀ’s—is, approxi-
mately, a bijection between the transitive closures of X and Y (more precisely,
the transitive closures of the unit sets {X} and {Y }; the precise meaning of iso-
morphism for Finsler can actually be debated, for it appears in diﬀerent forms
in his works).4 Finsler uses graph theory to explain properties and structure of
sets, something that later Aczel will make more rigorous and at the heart of his
theory of non-well-founded sets.
Mirimanoﬀ and Finsler’s works are remarkable: they go against the standard
approach to set theory at the time; and against the common sense according to
which objects are stratiﬁed and circular sets are “paradoxical”. For Mirimanoﬀ
and Finsler, not all circular deﬁnitions are dangerous, and it is a task for the
logicians to isolate the “good” ones.
The attempts by Mirimanoﬀ and Finsler remain little known. We have to
4A set A is transitive if each set B that is an element of A has the property that all the
elements of B also belong to A; that is, all composite elements of A are also subsets of A.
The transitive closure of a set C is the smallest transitive set that contains C. Given C, its
transitive closure is intuitively obtained by copying at the top level all sets that are elements
of C, and then recursively continuing so with the new top-level sets.
27wait till around the 1960s with, e.g., Specker [Spe57] and Scott [Sco60], to see a
timid revival of the interest in non-well-founded structures, and the late 1960s,
and then the 1970s and 1980s, for a wider revival, with Boﬀa (with a number
of papers, including [Bof68, Bof69, Bof72]) and many others. New proposals for
anti-foundation axioms are thus made, and with them, new interpretations of
extensionality on non-well-founded sets, notably from Scott [Sco60], and Forti
and Honsell [FH83]. Forti and Honsell obtain bisimulation; their work is then
developed by Aczel and Barwise. We discuss Forti and Honsell, Aczel, and
Barwise’s contributions below. On the history of non-well-founded sets, the
reader may also consult Aczel [Acz88, Appendix A].
5.4 Marco Forti and Furio Honsell
Marco Forti and Furio Honsell’s work on non-well-founded sets [Hon81, FH83]
(and various papers thereafter) is spurred by Ennio De Giorgi, a well-known
analyst who, in the 1970s and 1980s, organises regular weekly meetings at the
Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, on logics and foundations of Mathematics.
In some of these meetings, De Giorgi proposes constructions that could yield
inﬁnite descending chains of membership on sets, that Forti and Honsell then
go on to elaborate and develop.
The most important paper is [FH83]. Here Forti and Honsell study a number
of anti-foundation axioms, derived from a “Free Construction Principle” pro-
posed by De Giorgi. They include axioms that already appeared in the literature
(such as Scott’s [Sco60]), and a new one, called X1, that gives the strongest ex-
tensionality properties, in the sense that it equates more sets. (We recall X1 in
the next section, together with Aczel’s version of it.) The main objective of the
paper is to compare the axioms, and deﬁne models that prove their consistency.
Bisimulations and similar relations are used in the constructions to guarantee
the extensionality of the models.
Forti and Honsell use, in their formulation of bisimulation, functions f : A  →
℘(A) from a set A to its powerset ℘(A). Bisimulations are called f-conservative
relations and are deﬁned along the lines of the ﬁxed-point interpretation of
bisimulation in Section 2.3. We can make a state-transition interpretation of
their deﬁnitions, for a comparison with today’s deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 2.3). If f
is the function from A to ℘(A) in question, then we can think of A as the set
of the possible states, and of f itself as the (unlabeled) transition function; so
that f(x) indicates the set of possible “next states” for x. Forti and Honsell
deﬁne the ﬁxed point behaviour of f on the relations on A, via the functional
F deﬁned as follows5. If R is a relation on A, and s,t ∈ A, then (s,t) ∈ F(R)
if:
• for all s′ ∈ f(s) there is t′ ∈ f(t) such that s′ R t′;
• the converse, i.e. for all t′ ∈ f(t) there is s′ ∈ f(s) such that s′ R t′.
5We use a notation diﬀerent from Forti and Honsell here.
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Figure 3: Sets as graphs
A reﬂexive and symmetric relation R is f-conservative if R ⊆ F(R); it is f-
admissible if it is a ﬁxed point of F, i.e., R = F(R). The authors note that F is
monotone over a complete lattice, hence it has a greatest ﬁxed point (the largest
f-admissible relation). They also prove that such greatest ﬁxed point can be
obtained as the union over all f-conservative relations (the coinduction proof
principle), and also, inductively, as the limit of a sequence of decreasing relations
over the ordinals that starts with the universal relation A × A (akin to the
characterisation in Theorem 2.12). The main diﬀerence between f-conservative
relations and today’s bisimulations is that the former are required to be reﬂexive
and symmetric.
However, while the bisimulation proof method is introduced, as derived from
the theory of ﬁxed points, it remains rather hidden in Forti and Honsell’s works,
whose main goal is to prove the consistency of anti-foundation axioms. For this
the main technique uses the f-admissible relations.
5.5 Peter Aczel
In Mathematics, bisimulation and non-well-founded sets are made popular by
Peter Aczel, notably with his book [Acz88]. Aczel is looking for mathematical
foundations of processes, prompted by the work of Milner on CCS and his way
of equating processes with an inﬁnite behaviour via a bisimulation quotient.
Aczel reformulates Forti and Honsell’s anti-foundation axiom X1. In Forti and
Honsell [FH83], the axiom says that from every relational structure there is a
unique homomorphism onto a transitive set. Aczel calls the axiom AFA and
expresses it with the help of graph theory, in terms of graphs whose nodes are
decorated with sets. For this, sets are thought of as (pointed) graphs, where
the nodes represent sets, the edges represent the converse membership relation
(e.g., an edge from a node x to a node y indicates that the set represented by
y is a member of the set represented by x), and the root of the graph indicates
the starting point, that is, the node that represents the set under consideration.
For instance, the sets {∅,{∅}} and D = {∅,{D}} naturally corresponds to the
graphs of Figure 3 (where for convenience nodes are named) with nodes 2 and c
being the roots. The graphs for the well-founded sets are those without inﬁnite
paths or cycles, such as the graph on the left in Figure 3. AFA essentially states
that each graph represents a unique set. This is formalised via the notion of
decoration. A decoration for a graph is an assignment of sets to nodes that
29respects the structure of the edges; that is, the set assigned to a node is equal
to the set of the sets assigned to the children of the node. For instance, the
decoration for the graph on the left of Figure 3 assigns ∅ to node 0, {∅} to node
1, and {∅,{∅}} to node 2, whereas that for the graph on the right assigns ∅ to
a, {D} to b, and {∅,{D}} to c. Axiom AFA stipulates that every graph has a
unique decoration. (In Aczel, the graph plays the role of the relational structure
in Forti and Honsell, and the decoration the role of the homomorphism into
a transitive set.) In this, there are two important facts: the existence of the
decoration, and its uniqueness. The former tells us that the non-well-founded
sets we need do exist. The latter tell us what is equality for them. Thus two
sets are equal if they can be assigned to the same node of a graph. For instance
the sets Ω,A and B in Section 5.1 are equal because the graph
•
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has a decoration in which both nodes receive Ω, and another decoration in which
the node on the left receives A and that on the right B. Bisimulation comes out
when one tries to extract the meaning of equality. A bisimulation relates sets
A and B such that
• for all A1 ∈ A there is B1 ∈ B with A1 and B1 related; and the converse,
for the elements of B1.
Two sets are equal precisely if there is a bisimulation relating them. The bisim-
ulation proof method can then be used to prove equalities between sets, for
instance the equality between the sets A and B above. This equality among
sets is also referred to as strong extensionality because it is the most generous,
or the coarsest, equality that is compatible with the membership structure of
sets: two sets are diﬀerent only if there they present some genuine, observable,
structural diﬀerence.
Aczel formulates AFA towards end 1983; he does not publish it immediately
having then discovered the earlier work of Forti and Honsell and the equivalence
between AFA and X1. Instead, he goes on developing the theory of non-well-
founded sets, mostly through a series of lectures in Stanford between January
and March ’85, which leads to the book [Acz88]. Aczel shows how to use the
bisimulation proof method to prove equalities between non-well-founded sets,
and develops a theory of coinduction that sets the basis for the coalgebraic
approach to semantics (Final Semantics).
Up to Aczel’s book [Acz88], all the works on non-well-founded sets had re-
mained outside the mainstream. This changes with Aczel, for two main reasons:
the elegant theory that he develops, and the concrete motivations for studying
non-well-founded sets that he brings up.
Something that inﬂuences the developments of non-well-founded sets, and
that is manifest in Aczel’s work is Mostowski’s Collapse Lemma (proved prob-
ably sometime in the 1940s and today recognised as fundamental in the study
of models of set theory). The original statement of the lemma talks about
well-founded relations; roughly it says that given any such relation there is a
30unique set that faithfully represents the relation in its membership structure.
Aczel reformulates the collapse on graphs. It becomes the assertion that ev-
ery well-founded graph has a unique decoration. Axiom AFA is then obtained
by removing the well-foundedness hypothesis (of course now, on the non-well-
founded sets, it is an axiom, whereas Mostowski’s collapse on the well-founded
sets is a lemma). The collapse is also fundamental for the formal representation
of sets as graphs, as it allows us to conclude that we can associate a unique set
to each pointed graph, via the decoration. When Finsler writes his 1926 paper
[Fin26], the collapse construction is not known and indeed Finsler’s use of graph
theory remains informal.
5.6 Jon Barwise
Aczel’s original motivation for the study on non-well-founded sets is to provide
set-theoretic models for CCS. Jon Barwise brings up other applications, notably
the study of paradoxes such as the Liar paradox in Philosophical Logic and more
broadly the study of meaning in natural (i.e., human spoken) languages [BE87].
Further, Barwise develops a theory of non-well-founded sets that is not based
on the relationship between sets and graph theory as Aczel, but, instead, on
systems of equations. The axiom AFA becomes a requirement that appropriate
systems of equations have a unique solution. To understand this point consider
that, as the purely reﬂexive set Ω can be seen as the solution to the equation x =
{x}, so all non-well-founded sets arise from systems of equations with variables
on the left-hand side, and well-founded sets possibly containing such variables on
the right-hand side. In Aczel [Acz88] this is expressed as the Solution Lemma.
Barwise makes it the base assumption from which all the theory of sets is derived.
For more details, the reader may consult Barwise’s book with Lawrence Moss
[BM96].
5.7 Extensionality quotients: Roland Hinnion and others
More or less at the same time as Forti and Honsell, and independently from
them, bisimulation-like relations are used by Roland Hinnion [Hin80, Hin81] (a
related, but later, paper is also [Hin86]). Hinnion follows Mostowski’s collapse;
Mostowski’s construction allows one to obtain, from a well-founded relational
structure, a model of set theory in which Zermelo’s axiom of extensionality holds.
Hinnion aims at generalising this to arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily well-founded)
structures. Thus he deﬁnes forms of bisimulation on relational structures, as
usual the “transitions” of the bisimulation game being dictated by the relation
on the structure. He considers two such forms. The ﬁnal equivalences (later
[Hin86] called increasing) are the bisimulations that are also equivalences. The
contractions are the ﬁnal equivalences whose quotient on the original structure
satisﬁes the extensionality axiom. Roughly we can think of contractions as
bisimulation equivalences that are also congruences, in that they are preserved
by the operators of the model, i.e, by the addition of external structure.
31Hinnion does not formulate axioms of anti-foundation. Thus while imposing
the AFA axiom makes equality the only possible bisimulation for any structure,
Hinnion uses bisimulations to deﬁne new structures, via a quotient.
Although Hinnion points out that ﬁnal equivalences and contractions form a
complete lattice, he does not put emphasis on the maximal ones. The equalities
obtained via his quotients can indeed be ﬁner than the equality that the AFA
axiom yields (which corresponds to the quotient with bisimilarity, the maximal
bisimulation). Consequently, he also does not put emphasis on the coinduction
proof principle associated to bisimulation.
Constructions similar to Hinnion’s, that is, uses of relations akin to bisim-
ulation to obtain extensional quotient models, also appear in works by Harvey
Friedman [Fri73] and Lev Gordeev [Gor82]. In this respect, however, the ﬁrst
appearance of a bisimulation relation I have seen is in a work by Jon Barwise,
Robin O. Gandy, and Yiannis N. Moschovakis [BGM71], and used in the main
result about the characterisation of the the structure of the next admissible set
A+ over a given set A. (Admissible Sets form a Set Theory weaker than Zermelo-
Fraenkel’s in the principles of set existence; it was introduced in the mid 1960s
by Saul Kripke and Richard Platek with the goal of generalising ordinary recur-
sion theory on the integers to ordinals smaller than a given “well-behaved” one.)
A stronger version of the result is found in Moschovakis’s book [Mos74] (where
the main result is Theorem 9E.1, in Chapter 9, and the bisimulation relation is
used in the proof of Lemma 9). As most of the results we have mentioned in Set
Theory, so the Barwise-Gandy-Moschovakis Theorem is inspired by Mostowski’s
Collapse Lemma. While the papers [BGM71, Fri73, Gor82] make use of speciﬁc
bisimulation-like relations, they do not isolate or study the concept.
5.8 Discussion
It may appear surprising that also in Mathematics it takes so long for the notion
of bisimulation to appear. This is partly explained by the limited attention to
non-well-founded structures up-to the 1980s, as discussed in Section 5.2.
It is fair to say, however, that some of the very early constructions had
already a deﬁnite bisimulation ﬂavor. An enlightening example is Mirimanoﬀ’s
pioneering work on non-well-founded sets. Mirimanoﬀ [Mir17a] deﬁnes a notion
of isomorphism for sets that have atoms (often called urelements), i.e., elements
that cannot be decomposed and that are not the empty set. Two such sets E
and E′ are deemed isomorphic when the two conditions below hold:
1. The sets E and E′ are equivalent; that is, a perfect correspondence can
be established between the elements of E and E′
2. Further, the above correspondence can be established in such a way that
each atom e in E corresponds to an atom e′ in E′ and conversely; and each
element-set F of E corresponds to an element-set F ′ of E′ (an element-set
of a set G is an element of G that is a set). The perfect correspondence
between F and F ′ can then be established in a way that each atom in F
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Figure 4: Tree unfolding of the sets Ω and U
corresponds to an atom in F ′, and each element-set of F corresponds to
an element-set of F ′; and so forth.
Although today we would give this deﬁnition in a diﬀerent way, its meaning
is clear. Mirimanoﬀ’s isomorphism abstracts from the nature and identity of
the atoms. His intention—clearly stated in [Mir17b]—is to relate sets with
the same tree structure, as determined by the membership relation. (In other
words, if we think of sets as trees, along the lines of the representation of sets as
graphs mentioned in Section 5.5, then Mirimanoﬀ’s isomorphism is essentially
an isomorphism between such trees.)
Mirimanoﬀ’s isomorphism is not far from the equality on sets given by
Finsler’s and Scott’s anti-foundation axioms. These equalities too, indeed, are
based on notions of isomorphism. The peculiarity of Mirimanoﬀ’s deﬁnition is
that it is built on the idea of equating potentially inﬁnite objects by decompos-
ing, or observing, them top-down, from a composite object to its constituents.
This idea is also at the heart of the deﬁnition of bisimulation (where, for in-
stance, decomposing a process is observing its transitions). The “perfect corre-
spondence” used by Mirimanoﬀ is however a bijection between the components
of the sets, rather than a relation, and as such the resulting notion of equality is
ﬁner than bisimilarity. For instance, consider the purely reﬂexive set Ω and the
set U = {Ω,U}. It is easy to see that they are bisimilar. However they are not
isomorphic for Mirimanoﬀ as their trees, in Figure 4, are quite diﬀerent. (The
two sets are also diﬀerent under Finsler’s and Scott’s equalities; bisimilarity is
indeed strictly coarser than Finsler’s and Scott’s equalities, see [Acz88].)
What really makes Mirimanoﬀ’s isomorphism diﬀerent from bisimulation is
that Mirimanoﬀ fails to promote isomorphism to equality for sets. For instance
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{A,B} has two elements and is not isomorphic to the set {A} or to the set
{B}, which have only one element. To identify isomorphism and equality, the
clause of isomorphism, in establishing the “perfect correspondence” between the
elements of two isomorphic sets, should take into account the collapse given by
isomorphism itself. This can be easily obtained by weakening the requirements
of injectivity and surjectivity in the correspondences, for instance making the
correspondences total relations—i.e., making them bisimulations. In conclu-
sion, had Mirimanoﬀ investigated the impact of isomorphism on extensionality,
while retaining the spirit of his deﬁnition, he would have probably discovered
bisimulation.
However, Mirimanoﬀ pays little attention to extensionality. His main inter-
est, motivated by Burali-Forti and Russell’s paradoxes, is understanding what
are the conditions for the existence of a set of objects. And his main results
are theorems asserting—using modern terminology—that certain classes are not
sets. In Set Theory, even more than in Modal Logic or Computer Science, the
move from the “functional” concepts of homomorphism and isomorphism to the
“relational” concept of bisimulation will take time.
6 The introduction of ﬁxed points in Computer
Science
Bisimulation and the bisimulation proof method, as coinductive concepts, are
intimately related to ﬁxed points. We therefore also examine coinduction and
ﬁxed points. We do not attempt, however, to trace the general history of ﬁxed-
point theory—in Mathematics this is a story stretching far back in time. Instead,
we concentrate on Computer Science, and recall some papers that well witness
the introduction of coinduction and ﬁxed-point theory for the design and analy-
sis of programming languages. Knaster-Tarski Theorem 2.9, about the existence
of least and greatest ﬁxed point for a monotone function on a complete lattice,
or variations of this such as Theorem 2.11, are the starting point for all the
works we mention.
The earliest uses of ﬁxed points in Computer Science, in the form of least
ﬁxed points, can be found in: recursive function theory, see for instance Rogers’s
book [Rog67] and references therein; formal language theory, as in the work of
Arden [Ard60] and Ginsburg and Rice [GR62]. However, distinguishing Com-
puter Science from recursive function theory, the importance of ﬁxed points in
Computer Science really comes up only at the end of the 1960s, with four inde-
pendent papers, roughly at the same time, by Dana Scott and Jaco de Bakker
[SdB69], Hans Bekiˇ c [Bek69], David Park [Par69], and Antoni Muzurkiewicz
[Maz71] (however [Maz71] does not make explicit reference to ﬁxed-point the-
ory). Although [Maz71] is published in 1971, it is already made available, as a
working paper, in December 1969 to the IFIP Working Group 2.2, whose mem-
bers included some of the most inﬂuential researchers on programming language
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tinuations in denotational semantics, see [Rey93]. It might sound surprising
that [SdB69] and [Bek69] should be considered “independent”, given that both
appear as manuscripts from the same place, the Vienna IBM Laboratory. The
reason is that Bekiˇ c’s work is mainly carried out during a one-year visit (Novem-
ber 1968–November 1969) at Queen Mary College, London, where Bekiˇ c stays in
Peter Landin’s group (indeed Landin has a strong inﬂuence on [Bek69]). Thus
when Scott and de Bakker’s work is presented at the Vienna IBM Laboratory
in August 1969, Bekiˇ c—who is a member of the Laboratory—is still in London.
The ﬁrst time when the two works can be discussed and compared is the IFIP
Working Group 2.2 meeting in Colchester in September 1969. (Indeed, if we
were to ﬁx a date and a place for the introduction of ﬁxed points in Computer
Science it should probably be those of this meeting.)
The above four papers bring out the importance of least ﬁxed points for the
semantics of programs, the relevance of lattice theory and the Knaster-Tarski
Theorem 2.9, and propose various rules for reasoning about least ﬁxed points.
Programs take the form of recursive function deﬁnitions or of ﬂowcharts. Fur-
ther, [SdB69] paves the way for the fundamental work on denotational semantics
by Scott and Strachey in Oxford in the 1970s, where least ﬁxed points, and con-
tinuity of functions, are essential. Inﬂuential on the above four papers are earlier
works on program correctness and on uses of the “paradoxical combinator” Y
of the λ-calculus, notably papers by Landin such as [Lan64], by McCarthy
such as [McC61, McC63], and by Floyd such as [Flo67]. For instance, Mc-
Carthy [McC61, McC63] proposes the ﬁrst method for proving properties of
recursive programs, called recursion induction; variants and stronger versions
of the method are formulated in [SdB69], [Bek69], and [Par69]. Also, the ﬁxed-
point properties of the Y combinator of the λ-calculus had been known for a
long time (used for instance by Curry, Feys, Landin, and Strachey), but the
precise mathematical meaning of Y as ﬁxed point remains unclear until Scott
works out his theory of reﬂexive domains, at the end of 1969 [Sco69b, Sco69a];
see [Par70]. (Another relevant paper is [Sco69c], in which ﬁxed-points appear
but which preceds the discovery of reﬂexive domains. We may also recall James
H. Morris, who earlier [Mor68] had proved a minimal ﬁxed-point property for
the Y combinator; in the same document, Morris had considered the relation-
ship between least ﬁxed points and functions computed by ﬁrst-order recursive
deﬁnitions of programs.)
During the 1970s, further ﬁxed-point techniques and rules are put forward.
A number of results on ﬁxed points and induction rules, and the basic theory of
continuous functions, are due to Scott, e.g. [Sco72b, Sco72a, Sco76]. On uses
of least ﬁxed points in semantics and in techniques for program correctness, we
should also mention the work of de Bakker and his colleagues in The Nether-
lands, e.g. [BR73, Bak75, Bak71]; the Polish school, with Mazurkiewicz, Blikle,
and colleagues, e.g., [Maz71, Maz73, Bli77]; the work of Ugo Montanari and
colleagues in Pisa, such as [GM76] that contains notions of observations and
equivalence of representations in abstract data types that today we recognize as
related to ﬁxed points via the concept of ﬁnality. Other references to the early
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The above works all deal with least ﬁxed points. Greatest ﬁxed points, and
related coinductive techniques, begin to appear as well in the 1970s. It is hard
to tell what is the ﬁrst appearance. One reason for this is that the rules for
greatest ﬁxed points are not surprising, being the dual of rules for least ﬁxed
points that had already been studied. I would think however that the ﬁrst to
make explicit and non-trivial use of greatest ﬁxed points is David Park, who,
throughout the 1970s, works intensively on fairness issues for programs that
may contain constructs for parallelism and that may not terminate. The ﬁxed-
point techniques he uses are rather sophisticated, possibly involving alternation
of least and greatest ﬁxed points. Park discusses his ﬁndings in several public
presentations. A late overview paper is [Par79]; we already pointed out in
Section 4.3 that Park did not publish much.
Other early interesting uses of greatest ﬁxed points are made by the following
authors. Mazurkiewicz [Maz73] studies properties of computations from pro-
cesses, where processes are modelled via forms of LTSs; the properties studied
include divergence and termination. The way in which Mazurkiewicz deﬁnes di-
vergent states (i.e., the states from which a computation may not terminate) and
the technique proposed to prove divergence of states are coinductive, though—as
in his earlier paper [Maz71]—there is no explicit reference to ﬁxed-point theory.
Edmund Clarke [Cla77] shows that the correctness proofs for Floyd-Hoare
axiom systems—deductive systems for partial correctness based on invariance
assertions intensively investigated in the 1970s—could be elegantly formalised
by means of ﬁxed-point theory, whereby: program invariants become greatest
ﬁxed points; completeness of a system becomes the proof of the existence of
a ﬁxed point for an appropriate functional; and soundness is derived from the
maximality of such ﬁxed point. Thus soundness is a coinductive proof. Willem-
Paul de Roever [dR77] strongly advocates the coinduction principle as a proof
technique (he calls it “greatest ﬁxed point induction”). De Roever uses the
technique to reason about divergence, bringing up the duality between this
technique and inductive techniques that had been proposed previously to reason
on programs.
Coinduction and greatest ﬁxed points are implicit in a number of earlier
works in the 1960s and 1970s. Important examples, with a huge literature, are
the works on uniﬁcation, for instance on structural equivalence of graphs, and
the works on invariance properties of programs. Fixed points are also central in
stream processing systems (including data ﬂow systems). The introduction of
streams in Computer Science is usually attributed to Peter Landin, in the early
1960s (see [Lan65a, Lan65b] where Landin discusses the semantics of Algol 60 as
a mapping into a language based on the λ-calculus and Landin’s SECD machine
[Lan64], and historical remarks in [Bur75]). However, ﬁxed points are explicitly
used to describe stream computations only after Scott’s theory of domain, with
the work of Gilles Kahn [Kah74].
I do not know when and who ﬁrst used the word “coinduction”. The ﬁrst
appearance of the term I am aware of is in Barwise and Etchemendy’s 1987
book [BE87]; I am therefore led to think that the term has been introduced by
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in Mathematics (e.g., [Mos74]), but simply to indicate the complement of an
inductively-deﬁned structure. In Computer Science, the term is widely used
after Milner and Tofte [MT91], who use coinduction to prove the soundness of
a type system, and describe coinduction to explain the analogy between the
technique for types in their paper and the bisimulation techniques. The main
objective of the paper is indeed to advocate the proof technique and to suggest
the name coinduction for it. At the time of the writing, the authors of [MT91]
were not aware of the other occurrences of the name.6 Given the duality with
induction, the term “coinduction” is so natural to appear a kind of folklore
term, and this makes it hard, today, to trace back its introduction.
7 Fixed-point theorems
We conclude with a few remarks on the ﬁxed-point theorems of Section 2.3.
Theorem 2.9 is usually called the “Knaster-Tarski ﬁxed-point theorem”. The
result was actually obtained by Tarski, who, in a footnote to [Tar55] (footnote
2, page 286), where the result appears as Theorem 1, explains its genesis:
In 1927 Knaster and the author [i.e., Tarski] proved a set-theoretical
ﬁxed point theorem by which every function on and to the family of
all subsets of a set, which is increasing under set-theoretical inclusion
has at least one ﬁxed point; see [Kna28] where some applications
of this result in set theory [...] and topology are also mentioned.
A generalisation of this result is the lattice-theoretical ﬁxed point
theorem stated above as Theorem 1. The theorem in its present form
and its various applications and extensions were found by the author
in 1939 and discussed it in a few public lectures in 1939–1942. (See,
for example, a reference in the American Mathematical Monthly
49(1942), 402.) An essential part of Theorem 1 was included in
[Bir48, p. 54]; however the author was informed by Professor Garret
Birkhoﬀ that a proper historical reference to this result was omitted
by mistake.
Tarski ﬁrst properly publishes the theorem in 1955 [Tar55], together with a
few related results, proofs, and applications to boolean algebras and topology.
He had anticipated a summary of [Tar55] in 1949, as [Tar49]. Credit for the
theorem is also given to Bronislaw Knaster because of the following result in
[Kna28]:
Lemma 7.1 If F is monotone function over sets such that there is a set W
with F(W) ⊆ W then there is a subset Q of W such that F(Q) = Q.
6Personal communications with R. Milner and M. Tofte; the idea of using the name “coin-
duction” came up to them most likely sometime between 11 February 1988 and 17 March
1988.
37While Theorem 2.9 describes the structure of the ﬁxed points of a function,
Lemma 7.1 only asserts the existence of at least one ﬁxed point. Moreover
Theorem 2.9 is on arbitrary lattices, whereas we can think of Lemma 7.1 as
being on the special lattices given by the powerset construction. [Kna28] is
actually a very short note—about one page—in which the lemma is used to
derive, as a special case, a theorem on monotone functions over sets. The note
itself conﬁrms that the results presented had been obtained by Knaster together
with Tarski.
It would not be so surprising if Theorem 2.9 had been obtained around the
same period also by Stephen C. Kleene or Leonid V. Kantorovich7, although
the writings from these authors that we have today only deal with construc-
tive proofs of the existence of least and greatest ﬁxed points along the lines of
Theorem 2.11 (see below).
In Computer Science, Theorem 2.11 is often called the “Kleene ﬁxed-point
theorem”, with reference to Kleene’s ﬁrst recursion theorem [Kle52], and often
presented on pointed complete partial orders and for least ﬁxed points. The
ﬁrst recursion theorem is obtained by Kleene around the end of the 1930s, as
reported in [Kle52, Kle70]. Around that time, or anyhow before the 1950s,
Theorem 2.11 is independently known to other authors, ﬁrst of all Tarski and
Kantorovich (for instance Theorem I in [Kan39] is similar to Theorem 2.11),
but possibly others—see also the discussion in [CC79, page 56]. It is indeed
unclear who should be credited for the theorem. Lassez, Nguyen, and Sonenberg
[LNS82] consider the origins of this theorem (as well as of the other ﬁxed-point
theorems) and conclude that it should be regarded as a “folk theorem”.
Theorem 2.12 is from Hitchcock and Park [HP73]. Similar versions are also
given by Devid´ e [Dev63], Pasini [Pas74], Cadiou [Cad72], Cousot and Cousot
[CC79]. A related theorem also appears in Bourbaki [Bou50].
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